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You don’t have to follow every trend
Dear Reader
If the last twenty years have shown us anything,
it’s that the world of investment is not immune
to fashions. In the 1990s the future was sup-
posed to lie in the rapidly growing emerging
markets, until the Asia crisis brought a tem-
porary end to the boom in 1997.Then came
the New Economy, with the promise of fat
gains on IT and Internet stocks, until the spec-
tacular burst of the dotcom bubble.The next
great phenomenon was structured products,
a must-have fashion accessory even though
most investors didn’t really even understand
how they worked.Then the real estate bubble
burst in the US, and even big banks were
caught with their pants down.The current fa-
vorites are “green” companies, especially ones
producing “clean” energy, which offer investors
a clear conscience in addition to financial re-
wards. Just another trend? In this issue of Per-
spectives, Dieter Ruloff, Professor of Inter-
national Relations at the University of Zurich,
explains how fossil fuels, and in particular oil,
will continue to be the backbone of the en-
ergy supply for many years to come.This has
serious implications, because the price of
crude is closely linked to the political situation
in oil exporting countries.With demand set
to increase substantially, investing in energy is
an attractive long-term proposition. But given
the imponderables, it’s a decision that has to
be thought through carefully. People who fol-
low fashion blindly risk becoming its victim.
Dr. Adriano B. Lucatelli, Managing Partner
All the talk at theWEF at the end of Janu-
ary was of clean, renewable energy.The
race to develop“green” technologies, ap-
parently, is set to be the dominant devel-
opment over the next two decades.Who-
ever wins this race, it is said –Asia or the
West – will revolutionize the energy
markets, make huge profits, and secure
their own prosperity. But the statistics
published by the International Energy
Agency (IEA) paint a different picture:
people’s appetite for energy is increasing,
but for a long time to come the job of
supplying basic requirements – particu-
larly in the large, rapidly growing emerg-
ing economies – will fall to oil, coal, and
natural gas. Fossil fuels might be finite,
but contrary to what many people be-
lieve, the world still has more than
enough at its disposal. Coal is something
that all major industrial nations have
themselves, or can buy cheaply from re-
liable sources. Natural gas is supplied
across borders on the basis of long-term
contracts. Oil is a commodity which will
not be replaced in the near future, and
which has to be procured on the world
market. The only question is: at what
price?The answer is clear: the price of oil
is increasing, and,even more significantly,
it is volatile.Thanks to the political pit-
falls and rivalries involved, the oil market
is unpredictable, prices are volatile, and
poses risks for both investors and con-
sumers.
Fossil fuels, in other words oil, natural gas, and
coal, are finite resources. So in the long term
clean renewables will have to play a larger part
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in the supply of energy – especially if you con-
sider the environmental imperative of getting
to grips with climate change. Resources such as
hydropower, solar and wind energy, tidal power,
geothermal energy, and biomass are gaining
in importance. It’s clear that whoever gets ahead
of the game here will have a massive advantage.
But in the medium term there’s no way around
conventional fuels. Under its RS 2030 reference
scenario, where the International Energy Agency
extrapolates on the basis of current develop-
ments, in 2030 green energy will account for
around the same share of global consumption as
in 2007, i.e. somewhere between 11% and 12%.
In other words by 2030, any progress made on
the green energy front will simply have been
swallowed up by an anticipated increase of
around 40% in global energy demand, primarily
in emerging nations.
Radical intervention will be necessary if the
world wants to limit the greenhouse effect to
2°C, as resolved at the Copenhagen climate
conference. According to the IEA, the options
would be to use much less coal, make much
more rapid progress on renewables, much
greater use of nuclear energy (!), or build more
hydroelectric dams.This would be the only way
of limiting the increase in CO2 emissions (to
around 450 ppm CO2-eq) to achieve the 2 de-
gree target.The IEA’s very optimistic 450 Policy
Scenario (450 PS 2030) would require the rapid
development of effective global rules on redu-
cing carbon emissions.And it would also be very
expensive indeed, involving an extra USD 10 tril-
lion in addition to the already huge and rapidly
growing investment required. It remains to be
seen whether the world can pull itself together
for such a gargantuan joint effort.The more im-
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portant point here is that in both the IEA’s scen-
arios, oil will account for around 30% of energy
use. So even if we were to adopt a rigorously
green strategy, we would need more oil in future.
The global economy is still driven by oil.This ap-
plies particularly to the rapidly growing emerging
markets India and China, which are not yet fully
motorized, but will be.
Main problems of oil supply
geopolitical rather than geological
There’s no way around oil, and there won’t be
for a long time to come. But there are problems
when it comes to accessing, producing and trans-
porting the commodity. Firstly, the fact that a
large part of the world’s crude reserves are a
long way from main consumers, and often in re-
mote, inhospitable areas of the world, creates
problems in terms of extracting and transporting
the oil. Secondly, these are often crisis regions,
which makes producing and delivering the oil a
riskier and less reliable undertaking.Thirdly, there
is political conflict between some producers and
major consumers. Fourthly, but not insignificantly,
most producers and suppliers have dramatically
different ideas about what constitutes the best
arrangements for supplying oil: while classic im-
porting nations such as the US, EU and Japan
have opted for supply through private compa-
nies, who for their part procure their oil on the
global market, the producers mostly favor state-
owned oil companies working on the basis of
long-term, bilateral supply and purchase agree-
ments. So oil is a highly politicized commodity.
But while the geology is often difficult and the
geography frequently a challenge, the geopolitics
are even more important: who has how much
oil and where, and what do they want in return
for it, in monetary or political currency?
Middle East: hotbed of crisis
and the world’s most important
oil-producing region
As luck would have it, the most import ex-
porters of oil, and the world’s largest reserves,
are to be found in the crisis-ridden Middle East.
Every time the situation in the region deterior-
ates, there is an immediate impact on the global
oil price. Saudi Arabia is still the world’s biggest
oil exporter, as well as boasting the largest re-
serves. The kingdom derives a great deal of its
stability from the United States, either externally,
such as in the 1991 GulfWar, or internally – with
the necessary discretion – via the war on ter-
rorism. Despite all the rhetoric on democracy,
the United States traditionally has friendly rela-
tions with the ruling Saudi families. For its part,
Saudi Arabia supports the Palestinians in their
conflict with Israel, but this has never really af-
fected relations with the US, Israel’s closest ally.
Oil – assuring exports for the Saudis, and se-
curing supply to the US – is a much higher pri-
ority, and the cement that bonds these two un-
likely partners together. Saudi Arabia is also the
country that sets the tone within OPEC, exert-
ing a moderating influence on the oil car tel’s
policy. But in line with the trend, the Saudis are
also increasingly turning to the East now that
China has taken over from the US as the most
important importer of their oil. But while China
brings stable demand for oil, it cannot replace
the military protection afforded by the United
States. Nevertheless, geopolitics in the Gulf are
now also in flux.
Global primary energy supply
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Saudi Arabia 13.3%
Russia 10.5%
Iran 4.2%
UAE 4.1%
Canada 3.7%
Norway 3.6%
Kuwait 3.6%
Nigeria 3.6%
Venezuela 3.3%
Mexico 3.0%
Algeria 2.9%
Iraq 2.8%
Netherlands 2.5%
UK 2.4%
Libya 2.4%
Rest 34.1%
Source: IEA
Shares of world oil exports (2007/08)
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Kuwait and the Gulf Emirates – rich, ambitious,
but in many respects fragile small states – are
prospering behind the firewall of US military
presence.Without oil and the protective shield
offered by the Americans, they would have a
hard time in the volatile environment of the Mid-
dle East. Kuwait experienced this first-hand when
it was invaded by Iraq in 1990.The US has just
installed a missile defense system on the Gulf,
intended to protect the Emirates against the
threat of Iran.
Iran, the region’s second-largest producer of oil,
is in hot dispute with the international commu-
nity over its nuclear program. If Iran continues
with its stalling tactics to buy time for its own nu-
clear program, a “surgical” military strike against
its nuclear installations is looking increasingly
likely. In this event, Iran has already announced
countermeasures such as closing the Strait of
Hormuz, the route taken by around 90% of oil
exported by states around the Gulf. However, it
is doubtful whether it will ever come to that. For
one thing there is skepticism as to Iran’s ability to
enforce a blockade once imposed. And for an-
other, Iran would be shooting itself in the foot,
because a blockade would also put an end to its
own most important source of foreign currency.
This would hit Ahmadinejad’s regime, which de-
pends on the pecuniary satisfaction of its clien-
tele, where it hurts most.On the other hand, the
conflict with theWest has opened up opportu-
nities for China to do oil business with Iran. Here
“political” currency is also changing hands: so far,
China’s veto on the security council has pre-
vented tough UN sanctions against Iran.
Tough situation in Iraq
Before 1980, before it suffered huge setbacks in
the form of three Gulf wars and UN sanctions,
Iraq was one of the world’s leading exporters of
oil. A more stable situation is now enabling Iraq
to catch up with the top ten exporters again.
Even so, with the country’s oil production still
around only 50% of its 1980 level, Iraq still has
enormous potential if there were a return to sta-
bility. Oil reserves of around 115 billion barrels
reported by the USGS (the US Geological Sur-
vey) and the International Energy Agency are a
very conservative estimate based on geological
data largely going back thir ty years. There are
thought to be reserves of another 45 to 100 bil-
lion barrels under the country’s western and
southern deserts. If these estimates are con-
firmed, Iraq will have the second-largest oil re-
serves in the world after Saudi Arabia. Foreign
oil companies are expressing growing interest in
Iraq. Given the poor security situation, the auc-
tion of oil production licenses in June 2009 was
a mistake; only BP PLC and its partner China Na-
tional Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) acquired rights.
A further auction in December 2009 went bet-
ter. Malaysian company Petronas, Angolan oper-
ator Sonangol and Russian player Lukoil all bid
successfully, while US companies left the auction
empty-handed. So if the 2003 Gulf War had
been designed to ensure American access to
Iraqi oil reserves, it would have been seen as a
failure in these terms as well.
Russia’s ambitions as an oil power –
and their limits
In recent years Russia has advanced to become
the second-most important player in the oil busi-
ness. But even though it heads the rankings with
production of around 10 million barrels of crude
a day, only around 7 million are exported. The
rest is required by Russia itself, and this demand
is on the increase. In terms of reserves, the coun-
try ranks only eighth after the Gulf Emirates; on
the other hand, Russia is a huge country which,
like Iraq, probably still has very large reserves that
have not yet been discovered using conventional
technology, but which are likely to emerge once
more advanced methods are available.An inter-
esting factor in this respect is the Arctic, whose
oil reserves will get easier and easier to access as
global warming continues. Russia has already
staked its claim: a Russian submarine has planted
the country’s flag on the bed of the northern
Arctic Ocean.
Russia’s biggest problem is transporting oil and
gas to end-users.The states of the former Soviet
Union sit like a great defensive wall between
Russia and its European customers.These coun-
tries, which also want a slice of the business, have
so far been kept sweet with cheap deliveries of
oil and gas. But Russia is increasingly demanding
market prices, which has led to resistance. The
conflict with Ukraine escalated in the winter of
2008-09 until deliveries of natural gas were in-
terrupted. Russia hopes that the Nord Stream
pipeline, which will bypass unloved neighbors
Ukraine and Poland to transport up to 55 billion
cubic meters of gas a year via the Baltic Sea, will
remove some of the pressure.The country is in-
creasingly relying on the Baltic sea route to ship
exports of oil to theWest.
Two “natural” customers for Russian oil would
be China and Japan to the east. But this would
require pipelines to the Russian Pacific ports or
direct to China. After fourteen years of nego-
tiation, in early 2009 construction began on a
4,000 km pipeline designed to link the port of
Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan with the oilfields
in western Siberia.There is a spur of the pipeline
planned for Daqing in China.The project is being
funded by a Chinese loan of USD 25 billion. In
return, Russia guarantees to supply China with
crude until 2030. The option of taking a short-
cut through Chinese territory was rejected; the
entire main pipeline will run through Russian ter-
ritory. After all, trust is good, control better.
Emerging oil states on the Caspian Sea
Until now Russia has controlled the Caspian Re-
gion’s oil exports, a legacy of the communist past.
Azerbaijan had to export almost exclusively via
Russian pipelines. But the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline, resisted by Russia but completed in
2005, now enables Caspian oil to be transported
to the Turkish Mediterranean through Georgian
territory, thus avoiding Russia.The Central Asian
States find themselves in a similar situation to
that previously faced by Azerbaijan – particularly
Kazakhstan, the region’s largest oil producer with
exports of around 1.3 million barrels a day and,
according to foreign estimates, reserves of some
30 billion barrels.The problem is transporting the
oil to the world’s markets. Until now the region
has been reliant on Russia. There are plans to
create an undersea connection running through
the Caspian Sea to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline.A 3,000 km-long pipeline link with China
was commissioned in summer 2009.
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Supply situation for
USA relatively secure
At almost 20 million barrels a day, or nearly one
quarter of worldwide consumption, the largest
consumer of oil in the world is the United States.
At first glance this figure might give pause for
thought. But you have to realize that the US still
manages to cover around 44% of its require-
ments with home-produced oil, and imports
most of the rest from its dependable neighbors
Canada and Mexico, and old ally Saudi Arabia.
Despite all the rhetoric from Venezuela’s Presi-
dent Chavez, his country is the fourth-largest
supplier of oil to the United States, obviously ad-
hering to the old Roman motto that money
doesn’t stink. Overall there is a broad consensus
in the US that the country’s reliance on im-
ported oil, particularly from the Middle East,
should be reduced. But there is little consensus
on how to achieve this. Conservatives want to
move ahead with exploiting home-grown re-
serves, offshore, in Alaska, and oil shale reserves,
which have so far hardly been touched. People
further to the left of the political spectrum
would prefer the US to adopt a different, envir-
onmental course taking it as far away from fossil
fuels as possible. But there is still a very long way
to go on this path.
The real challenge:
China’s growing hunger for energy
China has become the world’s second-largest
consumer of oil, but still produces almost half its
needs itself. However, at around 16 billion bar-
rels, China’s reserves are relatively modest, and a
massive increase in demand for oil is on the
cards.The IEA predicts that Chinese oil imports
will have increased fourfold by 2030. Conse-
quently, Chinese foreign policy involves currying
favor with all oil producers, including those that
the old established industrialized nations are
avoiding for reasons of ideology, human rights or
social conflict. But China has even started doing
business with Africa’s largest oil exporters: An-
gola since 2004, and Nigeria since 2006. The
Americans, Europeans and Japanese appear to
be irritated by these moves by China, and espe-
cially by its strategy of pursuing exclusive, long-
term contracts.
But in actual fact the biggest potential reserves
are right on China’s doorstep: in the waters
around the Spratly Islands, an archipelago of up
to 100 atolls in the South China Sea, there are oil
reserves of as much as 300 billion barrels. But
the question of who controls the area is contro-
versial. China,Vietnam andTaiwan claim full sov-
ereignty, while other countries in the region such
as Brunei, the Philippines and Malaysia claim sov-
ereignty over parts of it. If the right to exploit re-
sources there is at stake, confrontation is surely
on the cards. For this reason, China is investing a
lot of money in building up a navy.
Europe and Japan:
dependent on the world market
Europe and Japan are more dependent on a
functioning world oil market than the United
States. The European Union uses around 14.5
million barrels a day, but does not produce even
a fifth of this itself. Norway, whose citizens have
twice voted not to join the EU because of the
country’s oil and fishing interests, is the world’s
sixth-largest oil exporter and a close, reliable
supplier to the EU. Japan, on the other hand, is
completely reliant on imports for its oil.
Volatility as the result of politics
Since the beginning of the 1970s there have
been huge fluctuations, both up and down, in the
price of oil. Adjusted for inflation, in 1998 the
price even reached an all-time low.The price of
oil is evidently dependent on the international
political and economic situation. In the 1973
Arab-Israeli War, the Arabs resorted to the
weapon of oil, massively cutting back production
and causing the price to rocket from below
USD 3 (nominal) to over USD 12.The second
energy crisis in 1979/80, a result of the revolution
in Iran and the war between Iran and Iraq, then
sent the price of oil over USD 35 (nominal),
which in inflation-adjusted terms is around the
price paid at the beginning of 2009. But the sub-
sequent slump in the global economy, where
the price of oil plummeted to below USD 15
(nominal), also harmed oil exporters. Iraq’s inva-
sion of Kuwait in 1990 resulted in only a mod-
erate increase in prices. More recently, the Asia
crisis of 1997/98 sent the oil price to below
USD 12 (nominal).
So the price of oil is volatile, and in turn this
volatility has a price, because it makes investment
in the oil infrastructure, from exploration and
production to transportation via pipelines and
tankers, expensive and risky. In 2008/09 there
was a huge decline of almost 20% in oil infra-
structure investment. Not only was the outlook
uncertain because of the financial and economic
crisis, but access to capital had become difficult
and expensive. According to model calculations
by the IEA, one consequence is that we can ex-
pect to see the price of oil rise very rapidly once
the global economy picks up again. Currently the
world’s oil producers are running at around 6%
below capacity. But this does not offer any pro-
tection against a rapid increase in the price of
crude. Producers, in other words OPEC, will ini-
tially want to boost their revenues by means
of higher prices rather than by stepping up de-
liveries. Another factor is that in the long term,
efforts to save energy and find substitutes for oil
in industrialized countries will not be sufficient
to offset rising demand in rapidly growing
emerging nations. According to the IEA, 90% of
the growth in primary energy demand will
originate from non-OECD countries, with more
than 50% attributable to China and India. The
current increase in mergers and acquisitions in
the oil sector is an indication of the energy boom
to come.
Higher oil prices will change the structure of en-
ergy supply. It will be possible to use new tech-
nology that up till now has been too expensive
to access oil reserves that had long been aban-
doned. As the price increases, extracting oil from
unconventional sources such as heavy oil de-
posits, tar sands and oil shale reserves will be an
increasingly attractive proposition. Most of these
reserves are in North America.
Counting unconventional reserves, the world still
has plenty of fossil fuel left. So far the human race
has consumed fossil fuels equivalent to around
USA 22.7%
China 9.2%
Japan 5.6%
India 3.4%
Russia 3.4%
Germany 3.0%
Brazil 2.9%
Saudi Arabia 2.8%
Canada 2.6%
South Korea 2.5%
Rest 41.8%
Source: IEA
Breakdown of global oil consumption (2008)
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1,000 billion barrels of oil. The IEA estimates
global oil and gas reserves at more than 20,000
billion barrels of oil equivalent. A quarter to a
half of this could be exploited using current tech-
nology, but as the technology advances the IEA
says this figure could also increase. Even so, from
a purely environmental point of view the world
cannot afford to steadily burn up all its available
oil, gas and coal resources. Given the growing de-
mand for energy, there is enormous investment
required.The IEA estimates that the investment
requirements will come to around 1.4% of global
national product up to 2030, and the figure will
be even higher if the “green” 450 PS 2030 scen-
ario is targeted. On the face of it these are huge
sums, but viewing them in light of the 2.5% or so
of global national product spent on the military
every year puts them into perspective.
No new energy world order in sight
Tackling the problem of oil price volatility would
require much more concerted efforts on the en-
ergy front. But there are no signs of this type of
collaboration at present.There is no “World En-
ergy Organization” along the lines of theWorld
Trade Organization (WTO) that could create
clear rules and stability.The International Energy
Agency is responsible for monitoring, advising
and researching under the auspices of the
OECD. But major oil producers and consumers,
notably China and India, are famously not mem-
bers of the OECD club. Attempts by the Euro-
pean Union to get Russia to agree to transparent
rules laid down in an energy charter have so far
come to nothing. A forum for energy stability
analogous to the forum for financial stability
would be desirable, but for the moment it re-
mains a purely academic vision. So the world will
have to live with a situation where the oil price
trends upwards but, most importantly, is subject
to heavy volatility.
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2009 proven oil reserves 2007–08 oil exports 2008 oil consumption
Rank Country Billion barrels Rank Country Barrels per day Rank Country Barrels per day
1 Saudi Arabia 266.70 1 Saudi Arabia 8,728,000 1 USA 19,500,000
2 Canada 178.10 2 Russia 6,845,000 2 China 7,850,000
3 Iran 136.20 3 Iran 2,719,000 3 Japan 4,785,000
4 Iraq 115.00 4 UAE 2,700,000 4 India 2,940,000
5 Kuwait 104.00 5 Canada 2,421,000 5 Russia 2,900,000
6 Venezuela 99.38 6 Norway 2,383,000 6 Germany 2,569,000
7 UAE 97.80 7 Kuwait 2,349,000 7 Brazil 2,520,000
8 Russia 79.00 8 Nigeria 2,327,000 8 Saudi Arabia 2,380,000
9 Libya 43.66 9 Venezuela 2,182,000 9 Canada 2,260,000
10 Nigeria 36.22 10 Mexico 1,986,000 10 South Korea 2,175,000
11 Kazakhstan 30.00 11 Algeria 1,891,000 11 Mexico 2,128,000
12 USA 21.32 12 Iraq 1,830,000 12 France 1,986,000
13 China 16.00 13 Netherlands 1,647,000 13 Iran 1,755,000
14 Qatar 15.21 14 UK 1,602,000 14 UK 1,710,000
15 Brazil 12.62 15 Libya 1,542,000 15 Italy 1,639,000
16 Algeria 12.20 16 USA 1,433,000 16 Indonesia 1,564,000
17 Mexico 10.50 17 Angola 1,407,000 17 Spain 1,562,000
18 Angola 9.04 18 Kazakhstan 1,313,000 18 Netherlands 962,900
19 Azerbaijan 7.00 19 Singapore 1,289,000 19 Taiwan 959,000
20 Norway 6.68 20 Qatar 1,043,000 20 Australia 953,700
Source: IOGA, Illinois crude, annual averages
2008 and 2009 display extreme values
Oil prices from 1970 to 2009
Source: CIA World Factbook and IEA
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